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ARTICLE
Building a new nation: anti-Muslim racism in post-uniﬁcation
Germany
Aleksandra Lewickia and Yasemin Shoomanb
aSchool of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; bHead of Academy Programmes, Jewish
Museum Berlin Foundation, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
Research has provided insight into ideas, agents and patterns of inequality
associated with Islamophobia. Yet, we know less about why anti-Muslim
racism is so virulent and persistent today. Focusing on post-uniﬁcation
Germany, we explore the broader function Islamophobia fulﬁls for society.
We draw on a discourse analysis of statements by four public ﬁgures, the
publicists Monika Maron and Alice Schwarzer, and the politicians Vera
Lengsfeld and Beatrix von Storch; two of them are from Germany’s former
East, and the other two from the former West. We found little evidence of
speciﬁc regional ‘ﬂavours’ of anti-Muslim racism, but noted that the speak-
ers’ diverging positionality in re-uniﬁed Germany shapes their Islamophobic
agitation. Our analysis shows how ‘old’ and ‘new’ Germans distinctly parti-
cipate in re-creating western identities as the unmarked norm. Anti-Muslim
racism, we argue, plays an important role in everyday discursive acts of
nation-building, and assists in justifying multi-layered patterns of stratiﬁca-
tion. Outward projections onto an ‘Other’, the ‘enemy within’, fulﬁl a key
function: the integration of a highly polarized society, at least on the
symbolic level. The collective in need of integration, our analysis suggests,
may therefore not necessarily be the one that is the main target of such
eﬀorts.
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1. Introduction
Anti-Muslim racism thrives across Europe. Popular tropes are animated by historic Orientalist
repertoires and often include quasi-pedagogical rescue attempts of the Muslim woman through
legal restrictions of her public appearance, depictions of Muslim man as hyper-sexed patriarchal
savage, and narratives that ascribe a speciﬁc proclivity to violence, conﬂict, homophobia, or anti-
Semitism to Islamic ‘culture’. Research into Islamophobia has identiﬁed key tropes and ideas
associated with this racist repertoire (Attia 2009; Meer 2014; Klug 2014; Shooman 2014), accounted
for political parties, social movements and public ﬁgures who advance Islamophobic political
agendas (Schneiders 2010; Hafez 2014; Shooman 2016), and oﬀered insights into anti-Muslim
racism’s manifestation in public opinion, its institutional reproduction and eruption in violent
hate crimes (Decker and Brähler 2018; Lewicki 2017, 2018). While we have hence gained an
understanding of the empirical facets of the phenomenon, we know less about how and why anti-
Muslim racism is so virulent and persistent today. Focusing on one particular case study, the
German context, we thus explore the function Islamophobia fulﬁls for society as a whole.
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Research into the gendered features of Islamophobia has highlighted two key functions so far. The
‘other’ culture a sexist hell for women is narrated as in danger of being ‘imported’ through ‘unregu-
lated’ immigration, on which grounds extensions of the security architecture and stricter immigration
rules are mobilized – domestically and internationally, technologically and legally (Abu-Lughod 2013;
Amir-Moazami 2014; Boulila and Carri 2017; Kapoor 2018). Furthermore, distinctions between Muslim
man as beast of prey and Muslim woman as sexual property uphold a gendered and racialized division
of labour; Farris (2017) has shown that the growing sector of professional care and domestic work is
disproportionately outsourced to women from the global south. Thus, the trend of securitization, as
well as current patterns of dividing labour, rely on and are productive of Islamophobia, which in turn is
constitutive of these political projects.
Our analysis draws attention to a third function that Islamophobia fulﬁls in European publics. Anti-
Muslim racism, with its speciﬁc focus on gender, we suggest, resumes a signiﬁcant socio-ideological
compensatory role in processes of nation-building. Scholarship on the German context has related anti-
Muslim racism to colonial practices (Attia 2009; Amir-Moazami 2014; Shooman 2014), the signiﬁcance
of the late emergence of the German nation state (Attia 2009) and the overcoming of the Nationalist
socialist project (ibid., Pratt Ewing 2008); pointing to the long-duree of Orientalist projections of
gendered deviance and inferiority onto Islam and Muslims, these works note that articulations of anti-
Muslim racist repertoires always involved simultaneous self-projections onto German society which
enabled the positioning of the latter as progressive and enlightened unmarked norm.
While we build upon this important genealogical ground-work, we also suggest that these
analyses have insuﬃciently engaged with Germany’s most recent nation-building project, which
evolved as a result of the country’s division and re-uniﬁcation in the 20th century.
The joining of two German states at the end of the cold war bore a range of asymmetries (see
Lewicki 2018). The transition from the communist dictatorship to a capitalist democratic system
evolved at great speed, and largely on the terms of West Germany. As a result, the majority of
leadership positions across the public and private sector, in politics, the media, or Universities continue
to be held by West Germans (Bluhm and Jacobs 2016), who also own signiﬁcant proportions of
property and larger enterprises in the East. German re-uniﬁcation furthermore was followed by
signiﬁcant migratory movements of younger people relocating from the East to the West.1 Beyond
these asymmetries, two societies have been brought together which had operated on distinct societal
organising principles for decades – ranging from the public role of religion, ideas of gender equality, to
the provision of state welfare. Last but not least, both societies had been discursively pitted against one
another – while West Germany was constructed as the capitalist successor of the Nazi state in the East,
East Germany was positioned as ‘lagging behind’ in terms of civilization, modernity and democratic
culture in the West (Kubiak 2018). In light of such disparities, and decades of projecting inferiority upon
another, German nationalism provided a key unifying tool.
In the following, we explore the role attributed to projections upon the ‘Other’ in this context.
Speciﬁcally, we examine how Islamophobia features in East and West German narratives of German
history and uniﬁcation.2
We draw on a discourse analysis of statements by four public ﬁgures who often participate in
public debates on Islam in Germany, the publicists Monika Maron and Alice Schwarzer, as well as
the politicians Vera Lengsfeld and Beatrix von Storch; two of them are from Germany’s former East,
while the other two are from the former West. While we found little evidence of speciﬁc ideological
or regional ‘ﬂavours’ of their anti-Muslim argumentation, we noted that the speakers’ diverging
positionality in re-uniﬁed Germany distinctly shaped their Islamophobic agitation.
Our analysis shows that projections into Germany’s past and future provide a key site of nation-
building, whereby ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Germans distinctly contribute to the making of western identity as the
unmarked norm: East German intellectualsMaron and Lengsfeld, raise the credentials of their anti-Muslim
agitation by highlighting their own oppositional stance to the GDR. On this basis, they inscribe them-
selves into and assert their position within a West-German identity, which can still be described as fragile
for people from the GDR. Schwarzer and von Storch’s narratives, in contrast, engage in re-framing West
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Germany’s last dictatorship, the Nazi era, by recommending a ‘moving on from the past’. Unpacking two
pillars of West German national identity, self-critical engagement with the Nazi legacy, and a focus on
gender equality, they project racism and sexism outward onto the Other, which allows them to purify the
uniﬁed German collective. Social contention, including about the asymmetries of the uniﬁcation process,
is thereby relegated to the domain of ‘identity’, which creates the illusion of simplistic solutions for
complex patterns of social stratiﬁcation.
Anti-Muslim racism, we therefore suggest, plays an important role in everyday discursive acts of
nation-building – and assists in upholding a diverse spectrum of patterns of dominance. The projection
onto an ‘Other’, an enemy within, thereby fulﬁls a key function: the integration of a highly polarized
society, at least on the symbolic level. The collective in need of integration, the following sections
suggest, may thus not necessarily be the one most frequently positioned asmain target of such eﬀorts.
Although the main focus of this paper is on Germany, the insights into the role anti-Muslim
racism plays within its’ nation-building project can also be traced in other national and suprana-
tional contexts. In the following, we will brieﬂy elaborate the key conceptual considerations and
methodological choices underpinning our analysis, and then turn to discussing the East and the
West German case studies.
2. The making of a self
The mechanism at the centre of our analysis can be described as the socio-ideological function of
racism. On the symbolic level, projections onto an Other provide an integrative tool, a way of
arriving at new certainties about ‘who we are’ and ‘how we do things’ – as it can be asserted who
we deﬁnitely are not, and how we certainly do not do things. The Other, as Kalmar observes, comes
to embody ‘what we fear we ourselves may be’ (2012, 16). The outsourcing of negative character-
istics and behaviours hence reveals less about its target, and more about the desire to re-imagine
and re-invent the self. Such projections, Žižek notes, function as an ‘Ego-Ideal’, the point from
which a collective can see itself in a likeable, idealized form, worthy of aﬀection (1992, 192).
Outward projections are thus not only instructive about ideas and characteristics attributed to
the other, but even more so give insight into the micro-dynamics of the making of a self.
This mechanism has been explored historically, for instance, by Kalmar (2012) who examined early
manifestations of Orientalism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, and showed how the
gendered viliﬁcation of Allah andMuslimman as despots enabled the projection of existential anxieties
about an uncaring deity and its worldly representation onto the Orient, ‘as if they were the downside of
Islam alone (and maybe of Judaism) but not of Christianity’ (ibid., 2). Scheer showed how during the
cold war, West Germany sharpened the contours of its Christian, enlightened and democratic self-
image against what was narrated as the Soviet Union’s godless ‘evil empire’ (2012).
In contemporary Germany, the debate about ‘Leitkultur’, a guiding culture for immigrant
communities, oﬀers a good illustration of this mechanism. During the election campaign in 2017,
the ‘what deﬁnes us?’ question circulated prominently. Then-Minister of the Interior Thomas de
Maziere oﬀered a response in an opinion piece in BILD am Sonntag, the major German tabloid, by
suggesting: ‘We are not Burqa!’. The headline was followed by a neat catalogue of practices that he
identiﬁed as characteristic of German collective identity, including statements such as ‘we show our
face’, ‘we stretch out our hand to greet somebody’, and ‘we do not link ideas of honour to
violence’.3 The catalogue attributes dishonesty, reservation and aggression to practices that are
sweepingly associated with Islamic contexts, and positions them outside the desirable collective. At
the same time, the unmarked self, the thereby constructed German collective, appears as honest,
transparent and peaceful. Thus, the opinion piece reﬂects the desire to unify German society
around certain commonalities, which, especially in a post-uniﬁcation landscape and the resulting
disparities, becomes accessible by means of a contrast to ‘what we don’t do’. In the following, we
investigate this mechanism more closely, focusing in particular on its micro-dynamics across post-
uniﬁcation Germany’s East and West.
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3. Methodological considerations
We draw on a discourse analysis, assuming that meaning making is reﬂective and productive of
social reality. In relation to racism, the analysis of discourse is important, not only because
discursive formations shape attitudes and opinions towards racialized populations, but also
because racism tends to be institutionally reproduced and translated into various forms of dis-
crimination. Teun van Dijk (2002) highlights that racist ideology does not emerge from interaction
in diverse contexts per se, but is acquired and learned through communication, thus through text
and talk. And vice versa, racist repertoires are ‘typically expressed, formulated, defended, and
legitimated in discourse and may thus be reproduced and shared within the dominant group’
(ibid., 146). A discourse-analytical approach contributes to revealing the criteria according to which
divisions between in- and outgroup are discursively constructed, and into how communities are
imagined and crafted, as well as into how these fabrications become part of collective knowledge.
Accordingly, we analysed press statements and blogs, social media, and journalistic and literary
contributions by four prominent public ﬁgures, the publicists Monika Maron and Alice Schwarzer
and the politicians Vera Lengsfeld (Christian Democratic Party, CDU) and Beatrix von Storch
(Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). Maron and Lengsfeld were prominent voices in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), while Schwarzer’s and von Storch’s engagement has been shaped by
and contributed to public debates in the Federal Republic of Germany (FGR). In our understanding,
the four speakers do not feature as singular elite actors who advance a speciﬁc political agenda,
but their statements are reﬂective and productive of a wider set of contemporary ways of framing
issues in relation to Islam in Germany. The four ﬁgures were selected as they have a track record of
public anti-Muslim racist interventions, which regularly gain traction within far-right online net-
works, such as ‘Politically Incorrect’ (Shooman 2016). The speakers’ concerns furthermore explicitly
chime with a signiﬁcant proportion of the German population (Decker and Brähler 2018), and, as
we show in our analysis below, also resonate with recent policy initiatives, e.g. legislation in areas
such as sexual abuse, immigration and integration.
The statements we analyse below, while not representative of German society as a whole, can
nevertheless be considered as of inﬂuential and norm-setting status. While we selected four ﬁgures
who self-describe as women, the analysis shows that their agitation is by no means limited to the
feminist spectrum, as has often been highlighted in the literature, but reﬂects a diverse set of
positionalities, from far-right, to centrist-right, radical feminist, to ‘old left’. Although the four ﬁnd
themselves on diﬀerent if not opposite ends of the political spectrum, their arguments in debates
on Islam turn out to have much in common (see also Farris 2017; Hadj Abdou 2017).
4. Life in the GDR and the making of ever foresighted revolutionaries
We begin our analysis with the discussion of statements by two public ﬁgures who were socialized
in former East Germany. The novelist Monika Maron, born in 1941, was an acknowledged public
intellectual in the GDR. She moved to the FRG in 1988, one year before the Berlin wall came down,
upon oﬃcially applying for a visa. Her work has since critically engaged with life in the GDR. In
2010, she positioned herself prominently in debates about Islam, which contributed to raising her
public proﬁle in uniﬁed Germany. She sharply repudiated then-Federal President Christian Wulﬀ’s
statement that Islam, along with Christianity and Judaism, now also belonged to Germany.4 At the
height of the PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) demonstrations in
late 2014, she travelled to Dresden and expressed understanding for the demonstrators’ ‘worries’,
and defended them against accusations of racism.
Vera Lengsfeld, born in 1952, was a well-known civil rights activist who opposed the GDR
regime. She now also harbours sympathies with PEGIDA. One of her regular contributions to the
popular right-wing conservative blog ‘Achse des Guten’ (Axis of Good), welcomed the protest
movement’s growth with the appeal ‘Sie sind das Volk!’ (‘They are the people!’). Lengsfeld was
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barred from practicing her profession in the GDR, subsequently expelled from the SED (Socialist
Unity Party of Germany) in 1983 and deported to the west in 1988. From 1990 to 2005, she was an
elected member of the Bundestag. When the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at wanted to build the ﬁrst
mosque in Berlin’s former East in 2006, Lengsfeld campaigned with a citizens’ initiative against the
planned mosque in Pankow.
In their anti-Muslim agitation, Maron and Lengsfeld both use their experiences in the GDR as
a foil, against the background of which they interpret the Federal Republic’s contention over the
meaning of an open, diverse society. Projections into the past, thus their experience with the GDR,
thereby play an important role in advancing their ethnocentric vision of a German nation.
Monika Maron, for example, runs a private political salon in Berlin together with sociologist and
writer Necla Kelek. Individuals like Kelek, often referred to as ‘native informants’, are important
allies for Maron and Lengsfeld; to them they are ‘voices critical of Islam’, which are ‘not listened to
enough in politics’. Their role, Monika Maron elaborated in an interview, reminded her of ‘our East-
West history,’ because in the GDR, ‘dissidents’ were also ignored: ‘We were troublemakers. And
today, the government would rather speak with traditional associations than with secularized
Muslims’.5 Her concern blocks out the fact that, for example, Necla Kelek participated in the ﬁrst
German Islam Conference, and that her 2005 book ‘Die fremde Braut’ (The Foreign Bride) was
reviewed by none other than the then-Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily in one of the
most widely read German magazines (‘Der Spiegel’).
However, Maron does not only apply the label of dissident to Muslim critics of Islam. After the
publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s bestseller ‘Deutschland schaﬀt sich ab’ (Germany does away with
itself), which presented an apocalyptic social vision of Germany’s demise due to disproportionately
high Muslim fertility rates, Maron and Kelek gave several interviews to the conservative newspaper
‘Die Welt’. Both rushed to defend Berlin’s former Finance Senator, who had also presented his ideas
in their salon. They decisively refuted accusations of racism, taking them as proof of a supposed
‘witch hunt’ for critics of Islam in Germany. ‘All of this reminds me of the absurd discussions in the
GDR,’ Maron noted.6 She complained about the growing suppression of freedom of speech, as
a result of which it was no longer possible ‘to speak without censorship.’7 Parts of the media, which
to her were ‘defenders of the veil and headscarf’, preferred to ‘conceal or sugarcoat obvious
grievances.’8 The critique of racist arguments, to Maron, represented the West-German left-liberal
elites’ betrayal of western values. In her contribution to ‘Der Spiegel’, she wrote: ‘Had the militant
critics of Islam grown up in an Islamic culture, like Necla Kelek, or had they spent most of their life
in the GDR, as I did, perhaps they would value western values more highly, for all their
imperfections.’9 Advocates of an open, plural society and of parity of participation to her are
‘German and European propagandists of tolerance versus intolerance and the equal worth of all
cultures,’ who join Muslim representatives in defaming and slandering critics of Islam.10 Politicians
in particular are seen as pandering to Muslims whose demographic growth could soon become
decisive for elections.11
Lengsfeld too equates Muslim immigration with an apocalyptic scenario, placing responsibility for
this development with the West German ‘elites on the left, who in the past vehemently opposed
German reuniﬁcation, yet were unable to prevent it, and now have turned to undermining Germany.’12
The supposed conspiracy of elites andminorities against ‘the people’ is a key right-wing populist trope.
In its Islamophobic variant, societal elites become ‘the gravediggers of occidental culture’. BothMaron’s
and Lengsfeld’s statements at times are suggestive of analogies between the current political system
and the GDR’s single-party rule. In 2015, for instance, Lengsfeld gave a public talk at the regional Centre
for Political Education in Saxony (Sächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung), that was titled ‘Why
(Not) Go to Pegida,’ and in which she stated that ‘disinformation circulates at all levels.’13 ‘As in the days
of the SED,’ the East German Communist Party, Lengsfeld concluded, ‘freedom of opinion only applies
to opinions that conform with the mainstream. (. . .) As in the GDR, anyone who has a job to lose better
keep their mouth shut.’14
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Wearing the garb of the one-time civil-rights activist, Lengsfeld attempted to stage her rejection
of an open, pluralistic society as resistance against continuous political oppression. Thus, she refers
to her critique of and resistance to the GDR regime to raise the credentials of her anti-Muslim
agitation. Foregrounding their involvement in the social movement that brought down the GDR
furthermore enables distance from West German perceptions of East Germans as ‘collaborators’ in
the GDR regime. Their dissident life, self-ascribed in the case of Maron, thereby makes both
agitators seem predestined to raise a warning ﬁnger in debates about immigration, Islam, and
Muslims. Accordingly, Maron feels that Germany is ‘threatened at its political and cultural founda-
tions’ by its current immigration policy, which to her ‘compels a people to commit collective
suicide.’15 In summary, Maron and Lengsfeld utilize their positionality within German history, their
ﬁrst-hand experience of the transgressions, but also the collapse and the disintegration of the once
powerful Soviet Empire, to warn the Westerners who, in Krastev’s terms ‘remained unscathed by
those traumatic events’ (2017, 11). In staging themselves as ever foresighted revolutionaries, both
speakers assert a Germanness in which they and their GDR past deserves an equal if not pre-
eminent role. In the next section, we explore how Islamophobic mobilization oﬀers a tool to assert
their own contested belonging to the German collective, and to shift the self-image of the republic
in the direction of a more hierarchical and nationalist political community.
5. Islamophobia as entry ticket into the German nation
The nationalist political project advanced by Maron and Lengsfeld, last but not least, secures their
own superior position within the majority-German collective. The reproduction of popular anti-
Muslim patterns of argumentation thus compensates for the fragility of national belonging, and
aims to place a far-right vision at the centre of the nation-building process.
Just like Lengsfeld, who initially was a member of the left-leaning liberal Green party Bündnis
90/Die Grünen, and then joined the conservative Christian Democratic Union in 1996, Maron also
shifted from the left to the right. In summer 2017, Maron confessed in the ‘Neue Zürcher Zeitung’
that she has not ‘been on the left for some time.’ The media stigmatized people like her, she
suggested, as ‘rightists’: ‘The newspapers and television stations say that I have a pathological fear
of Islam. The truth is that I really am afraid of Islam. But why is that pathological and not
reasonable? (. . .) Most Muslims are peaceful, it’s said. That is true. And yet, every time I pass
a woman wearing a headscarf [the German term used here is “kopftuchbewehrt”, literally “armed
with a headscarf”], I ask myself, what are you trying to tell me? That you’re diﬀerent than me? That
you’re better than me? That my granddaughters are going to be walking around like that
one day?’16 The motif of a looming Islamization frequently recurs in Maron’s writing. In addition,
she uses a classic rhetorical reversal of oppressor/oppressed, insinuating the Muslim woman wore
her hijab as a weapon and looked down on her as a non-Muslim. This rhetorical strategy, as Nadia
Fadil notes, diverts from common projections of passivity and victimhood onto Muslim woman,
turning her into a threatening untrustworthy ‘cunning ﬁgure’ (2018). It is precisely the ambivalence
of such contradictory projections, Fadil elaborates, that make Muslims appear as the ‘ungovernable
other’ whose presence ‘unsettles existing racial hierarchies and the established sense of
Europeanness’, and thus invoke political eﬀorts of domestication (ibid.).
Indeed, Lengsfeld worries ‘what “common values”’ there can be between ‘immigrants from tribal,
misogynistic, homophobic societies and self-determined, emancipated [German] women.’17 Lengsfeld
sees an insurmountable gulf between the majority and Muslim post-immigration populations. She
articulated this observation in her shocked response to a ‘Discussion Paper on Participation in the
Immigration Society’ that minority organizations presented to Chancellor Merkel in November 2016.
The paper highlighted common values between ‘long-established and new Germans’ andmade a case
for the democratic participation of immigrants and their descendants in various domains of society. To
Lengsfeld, the claims made in this paper ‘amount to the abolition of the old Federal Republic.’18 It is
interesting that she warns of a loss of the old Bundesrepublik. She refutes the post-immigration
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population’s right to participation, although some have been citizens of the Federal Republic for longer
than she has: by excluding them as outgroup, she inscribes herself into the ingroup. Shoshan (2016) has
suggested that this diﬀerentiated process operates through an allochronic exclusion which places East
Germans within Germany’s joint history, and thus renders their membership within the political
collective as redeemable. Germany’s colonial and the two divided Germany’s post-war immigration
history, in contrast, in which guest-workers (and East German contract workers) made an important
contribution to economic prosperity is thereby omitted, while the ‘other’ is positioned as incommen-
surable outsider. By integrating herself and excluding others, she consolidates the boundaries of what
to her should be a white national collective. Maron adopts a similar strategy. In a contribution to the
newspaper ‘Die Welt’, she scandalizes ‘Muslim spokespeople’ and their ‘list of claims’ and asks
politicians to ‘set boundaries’ for them.19 She brusquely rebuﬀs requests for Islamic burial grounds,
or the provision of Muslim pastoral care in prisons or the armed forces. Embodying a host who has lost
patience with her ungrateful guest, she insists on a hierarchy between herself as a member of the
ingroup and the Muslim outgroup, who are to be disciplined if they make moves to leave the marginal
social position allocated to them – by, for instance, claiming equal representation or participation. In
her public contributions, Maron frequently highlights thatMuslimsmake up amaximumof ﬁve percent
of the Federal German population and should hence accept a subordinate role, especially with regard
to visibility in society: ‘Invoking religious freedom, Islam changes our everyday life – vegetarian food in
preschools and schools, burkinis at swimming pools, mosques in places where Muslims do not live and
with architecture that does not take the cityscape into consideration. (. . .) I do not want to be accosted
by any religion in this way.’20
Remarkably, Maron’s scepticism and condemnation is not provoked by mosques that are tucked
away in industrial sites, but rather by the prospect of centrally accessible places of worship, which
renderMuslims visiblemembers of the cityscape. Paradoxically, it is not the lack of integration (of which
Muslims are often accused), but rather their successfully proceeding integration that rouses her
vehement condemnation. The upward mobility of minorities thus provokes a conﬂict of dominance
in that it is framed as a challenge to themajority’s privileged access tomaterial and symbolic resources.
Maron would prefer the Other to remain marginalized and invisible: ‘It is no longer part of the
vernacular to self-evidently refer to ourselves as German. We are indigenous or ancestral Germans or
Ur-Germans, not just Germans anymore. We no longer are German society, but the majority society.
That means we create parallel worlds through language. If there is a majority society, then there is
a minority society. Do we want that?’21 But who is the German ‘we’ in whose name Maron is speaking
here? In any case, those perceived asMuslims, and particularly those who practice their religion, are not
part of it (see also Weber’s contribution to this special issue). Their exclusion serves as an ipso facto self-
aﬃrmation of the contours of national identity.
Thus, by demarcating the boundaries of the collective both speakers adopt an authoritative
position of entitlement to political membership; the assertion of an ethno-centric collective places
themselves more explicitly within what they envisage as the inner core of the political community.
As Salman Sayyid observes, Islamophobia reactivates the contingency of the inclusion of East and
Central Europe as an authentic part of the western patrimony (2018). In this instance, the two
speakers reject the imitation imperative, thus West German expectations that East Germans
assimilate into liberal-democratic values. Despite their rhetoric endorsement of ‘liberal values’,
they propose a revised, distinctly racialized image of the nation that places them on a par with
West Germans – at the expense of who is marked as Other.
6. Outsourcing racism
In the following, we discuss the two West German examples. While their arguments are not
dissimilar, the two protagonists occupy a distinct speaker position which has implications for
their mobilization strategies. They too demarcate the boundaries of the collective by ﬁxating its
essence; yet, their eﬀorts are less directed at inscribing themselves into this construction, but rather
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at justifying their own privileged position within the dominant frame and purifying its contours.
While the speciﬁcities of East German history play an important role in the East German speakers’
statements, similar explicit references to West German idiosyncrasies are absent. Previous research
has pointed out that this lack of evaluative attention is reﬂective and productive of West Germany’s
status as unmarked ‘norm’ which in itself contributes to elevating and normalizing its superiority
(Cooke 2005; Kubiak 2018).
Alice Schwarzer, born in 1942, is a journalist, writer, and was West Germany’s public feminist par
excellence. She is the founder of a social research institute in Hamburg, a feminist archive,
a publishing house in her name, the editor-in-chief of the women’s magazine EMMA, the author
of several monographs and a regular contributor to major German news outlets. Committed to
second wave feminism with its focus on hierarchies of oppression and blind spot on intersection-
ality, Schwarzer is a contentious ﬁgure within German feminism. She turned to discussing issues in
relation to Islam in the 1990s, raising her public proﬁle considerably with this thematic focus.
Beatrix von Storch was born in 1971 as Duchess of Oldenbourg, studied law in the 1990s, and
currently represents the far-right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) in the national parliament. As
with the majority of leading AfD representatives, von Storch is from the West of Germany. She
founded, together with her husband Sven von Storch, the ‘Alliance for the Rule of Law’ that
mobilized to reclaim aristocratic property in former East Germany. Despite these interventions,
she frequently problematizes the asymmetries of the German uniﬁcation process and laments the
relegation of East Germans to ‘second class’ citizens. Rather than proposing redistributive mea-
sures, however, she redirects East German grievances by framing Muslim immigration as the ‘real
problem’. Von Storch, e.g. is a founding member of a Christian AfD sub-committee named ChrAFD
(‘Kraft’, thus ‘power’), whose manifesto pleas to preserve ‘Christian-Occidental culture’ from the
threat of ‘immigrants and Islam’.22
While East German speakers reﬂected on the signiﬁcance of what to themwas the ‘last dictatorship’
during the GDR, our West German examples engage with what to them are the last dark events in
German history, namely the Nazi era. In this instance, projections onto the past too play a signiﬁcant,
albeit distinct role in advancing a vision of uniﬁed German society. Despite coming from opposite ends
of the political spectrum, von Storch and Schwarzer engage in the re-telling of history and advocate
a departure from ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’: The self-critical interrogation of German society’s
involvement in Nazi crimes was a key pillar of West German national identity, which can now be
‘overcome’ in the crafting of a new ‘more conﬁdent’ uniﬁed nation.
Schwarzer says of herself ‘that the horror of the Nazi era and the Holocaust had a deep impact
on her’; in particular, she was put oﬀ by the continuities within public oﬃce during the Adenauer
regime.23 After positioning herself as active participant in the post-war denaziﬁcation debates, she
goes on to compare the swastika, and on another occasion the Yellow Star that Jews were forced
to wear24 to the Islamic hijab – suggesting that the veil turned women into ‘second class citizens’
(see Kerner 2009; Schneiders 2010 for further examples). Despite her concern with more compre-
hensive denaziﬁcation, Schwarzer supports the guilt complex thesis: ‘There is a particular German
problem: the inferiority complex, which can easily turn into megalomania. This love of the alien, the
elevation of the alien is an outcome of such low self-esteem.’25
Von Storch too thinks it is time to purify German history. She wants Germany ‘to ﬁnd itself again
after evil wars, crises and years of separation’, and proposes that ‘we become citizens again rather than
subordinates.’26 The new uniﬁed collective is thus positioned as ready ‘to move on’ from the dark side
of its history. Other AfD functionaries have also departed from the self-scrutiny on which West German
national identity rested, including by trivializing the Nazi era. Von Storch’s AfD colleague Alexander
Gauland, for instance, described Hitler and the Nazis as ‘bird shit in more than a thousand years of
successful German history’.27 Similarly relevant is Alice Weidel’s reaction to the recent #metwo
campaign.28 In her contribution to the twitter thread, Weidel argued: ‘Of course we have a problem
with racism; but it is not the [problem of] German citizens, but of those who do not want to integrate
and do not accept our values.’29 Despite projecting racism outward onto immigrant populations and
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playing down the signiﬁcance of German racist crimes during the Nazi era, the AfD paradoxically
instrumentalizes German resistance to the ‘Third Reich’. During the 2017 election campaign, an AfD
banner in Nürnberg-Süd Schwabach claimed that ‘Sophie Scholl would vote AfD’. Björn Höcke, the
regional AfD party leader in Thuringia, who also originates fromWest Germany, wore the symbol of the
‘White Rose’ on his jacket while marching next to Neo-Nazis in a rally in Chemnitz in 2018. The
appropriation of the resistance movement against the Nazis, and its leading ﬁgure, Sophie Scholl,
reﬂects the AfD’s self-elevation as revolutionaries against the looming Islamization of Germany –
a strategy not dissimilar to the one observed in the East German case, only that the main focus is on
West Germany’s last dictatorship, whose prominent position in the narration of West German national
identity provides a key reference for those socialized in the West.
The Nazi legacy, as Iman Attia reminds us, poses an obstacle to positively identifying with
‘Germanness’ (2009). The projection upon an Other, e.g. the attribution of a speciﬁc proclivity to
racism, anti-Semitism or violent oppression onto Islamic communities, makes it possible to distract
and move on from Germany’s own history of anti-Semitism, and identify positively with being
German. Our two West German speakers engage in distinct ways in this process. Although
departing from a critical starting point that problematizes an insuﬃcient denaziﬁcation in the
early years of the Federal Republic, Schwarzer instrumentalizes Nazi symbols to advance her
feminist project. She also draws on her involvement in post-war denaziﬁcation debates to legit-
imate and authorize her anti-Muslim racist agitation, such as her warnings of ‘megalomania’ and
‘love of the alien’.
Von Storch and her AfD colleagues delegitimize critical engagement with German history
altogether. By trivializing the Nazi era, and appropriating the resistance movement against the
Nazi’s, the AfD seeks to exonerate the public self-image. Although the left leaning Schwarzer, and
the far-right AfD functionaries disagree as to the desirable scope of engagement with the Nazi era,
they can establish common ground by locating contemporary evil outside the German nation.
Thereby, both tell the public ‘what we currently are not’, which is anti-Semitic, racist, or guilty.
Thus, the mechanisms outlined above are very explicit here – anti-Muslim narratives divert
responsibility for racism, anti-Semitism and violent oppression in Germany’s history, and arrive at
new certainties about the contours of the German nation, through attributing it exclusively to the
Other. Indeed, Schwarzer considers her attention to Islam to be part of her wider emancipatory
project: ‘I prefer to speak of the values we achieved in our society: enlightenment, equal oppor-
tunities, democracy. We need to start early with the transmission of these values. (. . .).’30 Von Storch
similarly sees integration as the acceptance of our liberal European guiding culture which has been
shaped by Christianity and the enlightenment.’31 In both instances, the speakers construct enlight-
enment as an ‘organic texture’ of German culture, as well as a process that has already and
exclusively been completed by Europe (see Mendel and Neuhold 2015). This narrative is highly
selective in that neither colonialism nor the Holocaust feature as part of the history of enlightened
Germany, even though we paradoxically are to move on from beating ourselves up about the
latter. The self that Schwarzer and von Storch are crafting is uniﬁed in being ‘free of guilt’.
7. Outsourcing sexism
Anti-Muslim racist agitation places the Other outside of what it constructs as an exclusively civilized
realm – this involves not only the outward projection of racism, but also of sexism. In post-war
West Germany, Katherine Pratt Ewing notes, gender equality became ‘a key ideological site for the
articulation of democratic values’ (2008, 5). The process of post-war self-invention, she illustrates,
involved the puriﬁcation of the image of ‘German man’, but relied on the simultaneous stigmatiza-
tion, denigration and abjection of the masculinity of the Other. West German activists reintroduce
this mechanism in the current nation-building project, where it additionally allows for the bridging
of diverging gender norms and preferences, including across East and West, as well as across the
political left and right.
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The debate that emerged in response to the New Year’s celebrations in 2015/2016 illustrates
this vividly. Women attending public festivities in several West German cities, most prominently
Cologne, were subject to a series of violent assaults including groping and rape. Before any arrests
had taken place, recently arrived refugees from Syria were alleged responsible for these attacks.32
Key public intellectuals and political representatives, including Schwarzer and von Storch, engaged
in an animated public debate on cultural explanations for sexual violence, and both connected
these events directly to the discussion on immigration from Muslim-majority countries.
Schwarzer, for instance, turned violence into a cultural phenomenon when she described those
involved in the Cologne attacks as ‘fanaticalized (sic) adherents of Sharia Islam’, who had ‘humiliated
the German state’. In the same breath, she accused the political left of a “false tolerance” and Islamic
associations of “backwardness”. The following New Year, she spoke of “uprooted, brutalized Islamisized
(sic) young men predominantly from Algeria and Morocco”.33 In her view, the events constituted
a political demonstration of “Jihadism from below”,34 and were intended to send a clear message to
women – that they were not welcome in the public square. In Schwarzer’s view, the reception of
refugees therefore jeopardized German feminists’ achievements (see Boulila and Carri 2017). During
the national election campaign in 2017, von Storch posted on her Facebook page: ‘The New Year’s Eve
attacks by refugees and migrants in Cologne (. . .) were only the tip of the iceberg. The constitutional
state’s loss of control now hits not only the metropole, but also small and mid-size towns, where the
world seemed to be “still in order”. The state of emergency, facilitated by Angela Merkel’s opening of
the border and laissez-faire politics, has now also reached the province.’35 The narrative is suggestive of
an invasion by a violent mob, the systematic erosion of the rule of law and a permanent state of
emergency. The political agenda resulting from this diagnosis is a catalogue of more restrictive
immigration laws, faster and more rigidly enforced deportations. These, by no means only advocated
by Schwarzer and von Storch, were quickly implemented by the then Coalition Government –who also
passed a new law governing sexual assault and linked it explicitly to the German Residence Act. These
political reforms, as Boulila and Carri note, normalize the racialized terms of the debate about sexual
abuse and gender violence a result of ‘open borders’ (2017, 291). Thus, the denigration of the
masculinity of the Other diverts responsibility for sexism onto the Muslim man and justiﬁes his
abjection – suggesting that the problem of violence against women is solved if we just get rid of him.
Even though Schwarzer and von Storch seemingly agree on the scope of the problem with
sexual violence – Muslim man’s barbaric inclinations – as well as on the solution – tighter
immigration rules – their points of departure are very diﬀerent. While Schwarzer describes herself
as radical feminist who opposes hierarchical relationships between men and women and the
attribution of speciﬁc roles in society,36 von Storch would like to ‘pull the plug on feminism’ and
advocates a traditionalist conservative vision that rests on the heteronormative family as a ‘key
emotional and social pillar of society’37. Despite the tensions between these two political projects,
the two can establish common ground in what they think is not the way to do gender – by
projecting sexism onto the ﬁgure of Muslim man. The stigmatization of the Other as patriarchal
savage thus oﬀers a strategy of consolidating disparities on the appropriate role for women in
German society.
8. The making of a new nation
Our analysis showed that both ‘old’ and ‘new’ Germans distinctly deploy references to German
history, and contribute, each in their own way, to re-building a uniﬁed German nation as
unmarked norm. Anti-Muslim racist agitation plays an important role in this endeavour. The
participation of East German intellectuals and politicians, in this instance Maron and Lengsfeld,
in Islamophobic agitation, invokes and stabilizes a uniﬁed West German identity, which, 30 years
after the fall of the Berlin wall, can still be described as fragile for people with a GDR back-
ground. The denial of rights to people who are perceived or self-describe as Muslims thereby
serves as a means of asserting their own belonging to this imagined collective. Their
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ethnocentric vision allows them to insert themselves at the core of this new ‘we’. Maron’s and
Lengsfeld’s interventions simultaneously derive their legitimacy from their experiences in the
GDR. Their positioning as dissidents provides a foil for their sharp critique of German immigra-
tion and integration policy. Along with Muslims, West German ‘liberal elites’ (a category which
includes all established political parties) are constructed as enemy agents which, today as in the
cold war, work toward the weakening of the West.
Taking a closer look at two West German examples, Schwarzer and von Storch, we showed how
their interventions draw on anti-Muslim tropes to advance diverging, if not contradictory political
projects. Yet, both advocate a departure from the German ‘guilt complex’. Paradoxically, in the case
of the AfD, the re-telling of Germany’s Nazi legacy is accompanied by an appropriation of the
resistance movement against the Nazi state. Here too, historic references are utitilized to raise the
agitator’s credentials. Two focal points of West German identity are at the centre of the West
German case study – the emphasis on self-scrutiny in relation to racism, and the fore-grounding of
gender equality as a site of self-invention. Propositions to control, unveil or abject those positioned
as Muslim ‘Others’ perform a compensatory function in the modelling of an enlightened progres-
sive collective self-image. Diverting responsibility for racism and sexism, anti-Muslim racist tropes
enable arrival at a sense of certainty about the contours of the German nation.
Our analysis supports Farris' (2017) observation of an ‘unholy’ ‘alliance’ between far-right
agitators, feminist activists and liberal policy makers that congregates in legitimating and imple-
menting anti-Muslim racism. We further showed that our four ‘examples’ are not marginalized or
speciﬁcally radical voices, and that their discursive framing of ‘social problems’ and appropriate
policy responses resonates with a range of legislative and executive political initiatives, including
laws regulating sexual abuse, immigration and integration. This is not to suggest, however, that our
examples necessarily are representative of wider society as whole. Instead, longitudinal survey data
suggests that a nationalist vision of society, which currently is strongly linked to support for
Islamophobia, resonates with around half of the population in Germany’s East and West (Decker
and Brähler 2018).
Thus, anti-Muslim racism allows for the redirection of East German grievances about the asymmetric
terms of German uniﬁcation, andWest Germany’s reinvention as puriﬁed enlightened collective. Ethno-
centric visions of new Germany gain stability via projections of alterity onto Muslims, which contribute
to reaching at least socio-ideological common ground on ‘whowe are not’, and ‘what we don’t do’. The
self-description as a speciﬁcally modern and democratic-egalitarian collective thus not only masks, but
also re-creates and reinforces hierarchical binaries between a privilegedWest and a disadvantaged rest.
As a result, the population in East Germany,38 as well as post-immigration populations, including those
self-describing or perceived as Muslims,39 remain distinctly, yet systematically, economically and
politically disadvantaged. Their experiences of disadvantage of course diﬀer signiﬁcantly, last but not
least in a disproportionate likeliness to be exposed to racist violence (Lewicki 2018). The outward
projection thus enables the fabrication of an egalitarian and post-racial self-image that stands in direct
opposition to the discriminatory actions that it justiﬁes.
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